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9 Legal Issues in Computerized Psychological Testing 
Donald N. Bersoff 
Hahnemann University and Villanova University School of Law 
Paul J. Hofer 
Federal Judicial Center, Washington, DC 
A decade ago a scholar writing in a legal journal asked the question, "Canl 
Should Computers Replace Judges?" (D'Amato, 1977). The article explored 
problems involved in developing computer systems capable of making the diffi-
cult assessments and judgments required in judicial decision making. In discuss-
ing these problems , the author quoted extensively from Joseph Weizenbaum, 
who in a well-known critique of computerized psychotherapy, sagely asserted, 
"Since we do not now have any ways of making computers wise, we ought not 
now to give computers tasks that demand wisdom" (Weizenbaum, 1976). Never-
theless, the legal scholar concluded that any humanistic misgivings about com-
puterized decision making are, at least for many kinds of functions performed by 
judges, outweighed by the considerable savings in time and money the new 
expert systems can provide. 
If this volume had been published a decade earlier, we might have raised a 
comparable question: Canlshould computers replace psychologists in the admin-
istration and interpretation of psychological tests? But that question is now moot. 
Computers already have replaced psychologists in many routine aspects of as-
sessment. Computerized psychological testing (CPT) is making significant in-
roads in educational evaluation, personnel selection, occupational counseling, 
and mental health diagnosis. There is little doubt that computers will generate 
new methods of assessment in the foreseeable future. 
Yet the question of whether CPT should replace psychologists has only re-
cently received the attention given the question of how CPT might do so. Coinci-
dental with the rise of computer-testing technology is the countervailing trend 
toward greater scrutiny of test use , particularly in employment and educational 
settings (Bersoff, 1983). We must carefully examine CPT to ensure that it does 
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not unnecessarily create any new legal problems for testing, and in fact contrib-
utes to a high level of scientific and ethical merit in psychological testing 
practice. 
As we have indicated elsewhere (Hofer & Bersoff, 1983), computerized tests 
may be vulnerable to many of the same legal attacks as conventional tests. 
Claims of cultural bias and other forms of unfairness are the predominant source 
of litigation involving tests, and such claims are likely to continue with any test 
showing disproportionate adverse impact on minorities or women, regardless of 
method of administration or interpretation. Although some types of litigation 
may become less likely by the switch to computers, especially challenges to the 
standardization and procedural regularity of the administration of the test itself, 
CPT could conceivably lead to new legal problems for developers and practi-
tioners. A leading editorial in Science predicted a "flood of litigation involving 
unqualified users" of computerized tests (Matarazzo, 1983, p. 323). 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION'S RESPONSE TO CPT 
To this point, it is not so much a flood as a trickle . There is, to date , only one 
reported case even tangentially involving unqualified use of CPT that we have 
discovered (United States v. Curtis. 1974) and that case, while having its own 
intrinsic interest, is irrelevant to our concerns. The defendant advertised a "Com-
puter Matching Institute" dating service, where couples were to be paired 
through testing by qualified psychologists and prompt computer processing. In 
fact, the defendant did not have the intent or capacity to match applications by 
computer or expert psychological testing, and simply hired clerks to match 
applications by hand . The court found a clear basis for a criminal indictment for 
fraud. 
There is now one reported case directly concerned with CPT which is ger-
mane to those mental health professionals who purchase software for scoring and 
interpreting psychological tests. We discuss that case at some length in the 
section on intellectual property, which appears later in this chapter. Aside from 
that , the most interesting treatment of some of the legal issues raised by CPT is 
found in two advisory opinions written by state attorneys general. 
The attorney general of Georgia (Unofficial Opinion , 1983) was asked by a 
judge of a county juvenile court if the interpretation of psychological tests admin-
istered to juveniles might be computerized. Apparently the judge was sufficiently 
concerned and unsure of the implications of CPT that an outside legal opinion 
was sought. The attorney general found no legal barriers to computerizing the 
testing process , so long as adequate steps were taken to protect the confiden-
tiality of juvenile records, in this instance, by disguising the names of examinees 
so that no identifying information appeared in the computerized records. The 
replacement of names with identification codes before entry into electronic mem-
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ory is common practice among testing companies and, along with safeguards 
required for all clinical material, should protect the confidentiality rights of 
clients. The opinion, however, does raise the concern that CPT might infringe 
unduly on the fundamental right to be protected against governmental "dis-
closure of personal matters" (Whalen v. Roe, 1977, p. 599). 
In Kansas, the state board charged with licensing and regulating psychologists 
requested an opinion on several issues raised by CPT. One question is of great 
interest to many clinicians-whether CPT may be used by professions other than 
psychology. The Kansas attorney general (Attorney General Opinion, 1983), 
interpreting that state's laws, found nothing to prevent use of CPT by others if 
such use was consistent with their training and with their profession's code of 
ethics, and if they did not hold themselves or their work out to the public as 
"psychology" or "psychological. " This issue is likely to be a continuing source 
of concern, and resolution may vary from state to state. For the most part, test 
developers and marketers have refrained voluntarily from providing clinical tests 
to nonpsychologists, but some CPT services have been less circumspect. A 
thoughtful analysis by state legislatures and professional organizations, such as 
the American Psychological Association (which has been studying the general 
problem of test user qualifications), of the responsibilities of CPT developers and 
users is required to protect the interests of the public. 
Another issue raised in the Kansas attorney general's opinion is whether the 
signing, by a psychologist, of a report actually generated by a computer could be 
construed as "taking credit for work not personally performed." Such a finding 
is evidence, under Kansas law, of "lack of good moral character," and could lead 
to revocation or suspension of the psychologist's certification. The attorney 
general concluded that the mere signing of the report does not, ipso facto, violate 
the provision, but that the entire report and surrounding circumstances would 
have to be examined to see if it would appear, to the average person, that the 
psychologist was representing the report as his or her own work product. It seems 
unlikely that a psychologist who reviews and endorses a report without any 
attempt to deceive others into believing the report was personally written would 
be found lacking in good moral character. But practices such as retyping reports 
as part of an effort to appear to have written the report personally may be looked 
upon unfavorably by regulatory boards. The new APA guidelines on computer 
testing (APA, 1986), which we will discuss more fully, make clear that there is a 
considerable role for the clinician using CPT services without pretending that the 
cookbook interpretations generated by the computer represent the user's personal 
insights . 
As with any other system where important interests of the examinee are at 
stake, CPT developers, marketers, and users must assure that tests are responsi-
bly administered, scientifically sound and sensitive to ethical issues of fairness, 
privacy, and professional responsibility. Though most litigation involving tests 
has been in the context of employment or education, clinical tests may not escape 
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judicial scrutiny. There are many cases concerning medical diagnostic tests, such 
as blood tests, which were negligently conducted and led to treatment decisions 
detrimental to clients. The analogy between these and psychological tests may be 
even more compelling for computerized tests, since CPT appears more technical 
and scientific than the traditional subjective interpretation of clinical tests . There-
fore, the same rules of negligence as are applied to laboratory tests could be 
applied to CPT. 
PSYCHOLOGY'S RESPONSE TO CPT 
The threat of litigation is one of the reasons it is important to build a consensus 
about the requirements of good practice for developing and using CPT. This 
work involves not only analyzing the scientific and ethical issues, but also 
formalizing this consensus into written standards, into contracts among practi-
tioners and testing services, and into state laws and regulations . Some of the 
issues are not strictly scientific or ethical but represent the profession's pragmatic 
judgment about the best way to allocate the burdens and risks of CPT among the 
different professionals engaged in developing, marketing, and using comput-
erized tests . 
Though professional standards do not have the force of law, they do play an 
important role in actions for professional negligence . In these malpractice ac-
tions, one of several points a plaintiff must prove is that the practitioner violated 
the prevailing "standard of care." The standard of care is usually placed in 
evidence through the testimony of expert witnesses who rely on their own opin-
ion, current research, scholarly publications, and documents developed by rele-
vant professional and scientific associations. If the plaintiff can show that the test 
user, developer, or publisher violated the standard of care (plus the other compo-
nents of a malpractice claim), the plaintiff prevails. Violations may occur, for 
example, through negligent entry of data , the selection of a system that the 
psychologist should know is inappropriate for the client, creating unreasonable 
risks as a result, or through unreasonable reliance and interpretation of the 
information gleaned from CPT (Nimmer, 1985). Conversely, if the defendant can 
show that he or she conformed with the standard of care there is a greatly 
increased probability that no liability will be found . 
In addition to their use in legal actions, professional standards can serve as 
rules of conduct binding on members of the professional organization adopting 
the standards . Failure to conform to them subjects members to censure by profes-
sional ethics committees and, perhaps , delicensure by the state. Alternatively, 
standards can be adopted as purely aspirational guidelines. APAI AERA/NCME 
Test Standards (1985) distinguish between those that are primary and should be 
followed in the absence of sound professional reasons not to do so and those that 
are secondary and more advisory and aspirational. Any CPT-specific guidelines 
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must have a clearly stated purpose, and the obligations they create for APA 
members must be explicit. 
There are several sources of ethical guidelines relevant to CPT. The APA first 
adopted interim standards of "Automated Test Scoring and Interpretation Prac-
tices" more than 20 years ago (APA, 1966). In addition, the 1974 Standards for 
Educational and Psychological Tests (APA, AERA, NCME, 1974), the revised 
1985 Standards (APA, 1985), the 1977 Standards for Providers of Psychological 
Services (APA, 1977) and its recently adopted revision, the General Guidelines 
for Providers of Psychological Services (APA, 1987), as well as the 1981 Spe-
cialty Guidelinesfor the Delivery of Services, (APA, 1981) all contain references 
to computerized assessment. However, in these latter documents, many CPT 
issues are subsumed under general standards applicable to all types of testing or 
psychological practices and the specific implications for CPT may not be clear. 
Several state associations and private groups have tackled the problem of 
CPT-specific standards. For example, the Colorado Psychological Association 
has adopted recommended "Guidelines for the Use of Computerized Testing 
Services" (Colorado Psychological Association, 1982) and the Kansas Psycho-
logical Association has apparently done so as well (Petterson, 1983). A group of 
respected psychometricians working on the implementation of an adaptive ver-
sion of the Armed Services Vocational AptitUde Battery, produced some "Tech-
nical Guidelines for Assessing Computerized Adaptive Tests," (Green, Bock, 
Humphreys, Linn, & Reckase, 1984). A book (Schwartz, 1984) on the use of 
computers in clinical practice contains several chapters (e.g., Zachary & Pope, 
1984) addressing ethical issues . Many articles addressing the need for standards 
are appearing in the psychological literature (e.g., Skinner & Pakula, 1986; 
Matarazzo, 1986, in press; Burke & Normand, 1985; Hofer & Green, 1985). The 
present authors prepared a document (Hofer & Bersoff, 1983), "Standards for 
the Administration and Interpretation of Computerized Psychological Testing," 
for a testing service concerned about the void left by the absence of adequate 
guidelines. 
Given all these sources, many observers have seen the need for organizing the 
issues unique to CPT under more specific, official, and national standards . The 
American Psychological Association's Board of Directors in January, 1984, in-
structed the Committee on Professional Standards and the Committee on Psycho-
logical Tests and Assessment to develop guidelines specific to CPT. These guide-
lines, having gone through several revisions and review by the APA governance, 
were adopted by the APA Council of Representatives in February, 1986. Impor-
tantly, at this point, the guidelines are considered advisory. After they have been 
tested in the real world, the APA may wish to revise them once again and make 
them binding standards. For now these guidelines are the clearest statement of 
the requirements of good practice, and professionals should familiarize them-
selves with them. Hofer (1985) and Hofer and Green (1985) provide an overview 
and discussion. 
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROFESSIONALS 
Should there be any legal challenge to the administration, interpretation, and 
decisions related to computer-based tests, both the testing service and the test 
user are likely to be named as defendants . Both may be ultimately liable , either 
as joint wrongdoers or as individuals each responsible for their own negligence. 
In such cases, it might appear that clinicians could rely on a defense that they 
were ignorant of the underlying bases for the interpretations they accepted and 
passed along to their clients . But, such a defense would be an admission that the 
clinician violated the APA Ethical Principles and engaged in professional negli-
gence. The Ethical Principles of Psychologists, Principle 8(e) (APA, 1981, p. 
637) states: "Psychologists offering scoring and interpretation services are able 
to produce appropriate evidence for the validity of the programs and procedures 
used in arriving at interpretations." 
Conversely, testing services will probably not be able to place the entire blame 
on the user for injurious decisions resulting from negligent interpretations, and 
they could be held liable under a number of legal theories. Placing the responsi-
bility for the validity of reports entirely on the user might erode the usefulness of 
CPT as reviewing the validity of each interpretive statement could be comparable 
with writing the entire report oneself, and most people use CPT to save time and 
effort. Actuarial interpretations and statistical predictions of behavior are best 
made using the power of the computer to summarize empirical relations . In-
terpretations that can be validated empirically should be. Predictive validation is 
often legally required when selecting applicants for jobs, and it should be encour-
aged for other important interpretations, such as treatment recommendations and 
prognoses . In cases where interpretations are based on empirical findings rather 
than clinical judgment, and where the clinician has no additional reason to 
believe the finding is invalid for that test taker, it may be better for practitioners 
to accept the computerized interpretation without alteration . 
These considerations suggest that some division of labor and responsibility 
between developer and user must be found. The gist of the APA guidelines is: 
The validity and reliability of the computerized version of a test should be 
established by the developer, but CPT interpretations should be used only in 
conjunction with professional review. This rather general principle might be 
elaborated into a more specific assignment of responsibilities. The developer 
seems in the best position to assure that the scales and research on which the 
report is based are not obsolete or otherwise inadequate . Actuarially based in-
terpretations should use the best research and statistical equations. Developers 
can stay abreast of relevant research, incorporate new findings into the system, 
and direct practitioners to research that may assist them in properly using the 
report. Users can then concentrate on overseeing the context of the testing and 
evaluating the appropriateness of the norms and validation studies used by the 
system for interpreting any particular client's scores. They can concentrate on 
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gathering clinical information not used by the CPT system but relevant to clinical 
decision making. By specializing and working together, developers and users can 
assure the full advantages of CPT are realized. 
For users to meet their responsibilities to review the validity of a CPT report 
for each test taker, they must have information about the interpretation system. 
They need to know how interpretations are derived from original item responses. 
Some of this information is best suited for inclusion in each report, and some can 
be included in a manual outlining general features of the interpretation system. A 
major potential conflict in CPT is the tension between users' needs for sufficient 
information to review reports, and developers' proprietary interest in their al-
gorithms , software, and other business assets . 
This conflict is real, but a satisfactory compromise may be available. The 
APA guidelines call for disclosure of "how interpretations are derived" and 
information on "the nature of the relationship" between scores and interpreta-
tions. Users need not know all the decision rules and algorithms used by the 
testing service, but they must know enough to review any report they actually 
use. For this type of review it would be helpful to know the examinee's score on 
relevant tests or scales, or the entire matrix of responses. The clinician must be 
informed of the research or clinical evidence used to make the interpretations. 
Ideally, the link between scores and interpretations would be made explicit by 
indicating which statements are derived from which scales. Users can then re-
view the validity of the inference from test score to interpretation, based on their 
own knowledge of the test, validation research, and the examinee. In cases where 
interpretations are clinically based, users must have information needed to weigh 
the credibility of the expert. The names and credentials of these experts could be 
provided, along with their theoretical rationale. 
In addition to the demands for disclosure created by the user's need for 
information to select a system and review reports, the traditions of science and 
scholarship require that some of the CPT enterprise be open to critical scrutiny. 
Independent critical review has been a special tradition in psychological testing, 
including CPT (Buros, 1978), and has helped maintain links between research 
and practice. The Buros- Nebraska Institute is mentioned specifically in the 
guidelines, and the APA has expressed a strong preference that the tradition of 
open and critical review of tests be maintained. 
The guidelines stop short of requiring full access, however, calling instead for 
"adequate" disclosure and describing several methods reviewers might use to 
test a system without infringing on the developer's proprietary rights . For exam-
ple, the guidelines call for free communication between reviewers and tech-
nically qualified and knowledgeable professional developers. They suggest that 
reviewers be given access to the system for "exercising" its components . The 
"general structure of the algorithms and the basis for transforming test responses 
into interpretive reports" should be made known (APA , 1986, p. 23). But the 
guidelines specifically exclude a requirement of access to the full library of 
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interpretive statements or the specific values of cutting scores or configurations. 
The guidelines express the opinion that algorithms can usually be explained in 
enough detail without disclosing trade secrets. But if access to trade secrets is 
needed for adequate review, the testing service's rights should be protected 
through contracts between the service and scholar. Even though secrecy is crucial 
to maintaining one's usual rights under trade secret protection, properly drafted 
agreements can protect the information against disclosure by reviewers or 
employees. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The issue of disclosure of information about interpretive systems to practitioners 
and scholars is but one of many issues surrounding the ownership of intellectual 
property- copyrights, trade secrets, and patents. Copyright protects against the 
unauthorized reproduction of literary or other works . The printed questions in a 
test booklet or, in most cases, the object code of a CPT program are two 
examples. Trade secrets are generally defined as formulas, patterns, devices, or 
compilations of information used in one's business, giving the owner a com-
petitive advantage over others who do not know or use them. The formula for a 
soft drink or a source code, kept in secret, by a CPT developer are two examples. 
Patent law protects novel processes, machines, and manufactured items and 
gives the owner of the patent a 17-year monopoly. Patents have been granted to 
some computerized processes, but the law in this area is so unsettled that most 
computer-law experts advise against using patent law to protect computer pro-
grams, at least for the foreseeable future (Remer, 1982). 
There are several complex and unresolved legal problems related to copyright 
as well. Indeed, any litigation arising from the growth of CPT could create 
important legal precedents. As a precursor to these brief remarks, let us say-as 
a means of protecting ourselves- that we are offering a personal opinion on 
these matters and not legal advice on which readers should rely. 
The debate about the copyright protection accorded computer-testing systems 
is, in important respects , a debate about software protection. What causes diffi-
culties in the analysis of software protection is that software is both mechanical 
and symbolic. That is , a program installed on a computer is used to mechanically 
operate the machine, but the program itself only symbolically represents the 
hard-wiring of the machine. Software engineers do not build software, they write 
it. Because of this and because literary works are copyrightable, software has 
been argued to be suitable for copyright protection . Copyright law protects the 
computer program itself- the specific language of the program that can be 
expressed in human-readable symbols. How far the law goes or will go to protect 
other forms of the program- the object code, the appearance of the output 
display, or a flow chart of the logic , for example-is not completely settled 
(Mandel , 1984). 
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Object codes are created from source codes . Source codes are the program that 
the programmer writes-the computer instructions in a specific computer lan-
guage. The object code is created from the source code and is usually printed as 
ones or zeros, the machine-readable instructions for the computer. As a practical 
matter, it is generally only the object code of a program that becomes available to 
the public and thus requires copyright protection. Flow charts and source codes 
can be held as trade secrets. The output and visual display of a program often 
reveals significant aspects of the underlying logic and information contained in a 
program. "Reverse engineering" can give competitors a head start in developing 
similar programs. It is unclear what protection, if any, copyright might offer 
against this . And, unlike patent law, copyright does not protect against indepen-
dent discovery of the information or process. 
Various forms of the computer program are but a part of the intellectual 
property needed to create and interpret tests. Other types of potential intellectual 
property involved in CPT are: (1) test questions and interpretive statements used 
to construct reports; (2) answer sheets and scoring keys; (3) norms or other data 
used for interpretation, and (4) classification systems, i.e. , the algorithms used to 
assign interpretations to scale values or configurations of scale values. Each 
category of subject matter raises interesting and complex questions of ownership. 
The actual statements contained in a test or the library of statements used to 
generate reports are clearly copyrightable subject matter. They are the expression 
of ideas, rather than the ideas themselves . They are "original works of au-
thorship" as to which copyright protection subsists under the Federal Copyright 
Act of 1976 (17 U.S.c. § I02(a)), i.e., Volume 17 of The United States Code, 
the federal copyright laws. Accordingly, assuming the other requirements for 
copyright protection have been met, the copyright holder undoubtedly enjoys 
protection for the actual language used in the test statements and reports. Any 
copying of those statements, including the entering of the statements into a 
computer memory in digital form, could subject the copier to liability for 
copyright infringement. Copyright infringement consists of copying or substan-
tial copying of copyright materials to which one has had access. 
A thornier problem arises if paraphrases of statements are used. Whether 
copyright protection would extend to these paraphrases depends on the degree of 
similarity between the paraphrase and the original statement. It is impossible to 
assess in the abstract whether entering paraphrases would or would not violate 
any copyrights held by the publisher. As a general matter, the closer the rela-
tionship between the paraphrase and the original statement, the more likely it is 
that the paraphrase will be held to infringe the copyright in the original . An even 
more interesting question arises if a user simply puts in the number of the item on 
a program while the test taker has a copy of the test in front of him or her. There 
is no actual copying but we would imagine that test publishers would complain 
about this. If we were acting as a prudent counselor to a client, we would advise 
that there are significant risks in this regard in the absence of reasonable compen-
sation to the publishers. 
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The particular form of answer sheet or scoring key is also subject to copyright 
protection. It would violate the law to make a photocopy or otherwise duplicate a 
copyrighted answer sheet and use it as one's own. However, a copyright in a 
particular answer sheet does not give the copyright holder an absolute right to 
control all possible forms of answer sheets for a test. Courts are likely to rule that 
one could develop one's own answer sheet for use in grading tests, unless the test 
was explicitly and exclusively designed in consumable format. There are several 
ways in which test publishers may be compensated for multiple administration of 
their tests. One way may be through licensing agreements . In those cases, use of 
the questions without compensation to the copyright holder of the test could be 
prohibited regardless of what form of answer sheet or scoring keys were used . 
As a practical matter, answer sheets are needed only if one has access to the 
test. The computerization of testing may eventually preclude concerns raised by 
the present splitting of the components of testing into questions, answer sheets, 
and other separately copyrighted pieces. But for now, the information and pro-
cesses required for testing and interpretation are accessible to the public in 
various forms and subject to varying protections under existing law. As a result, 
there are many difficult questions of ownership. For example, in the purely 
physical sense, the scoring key is the mechanical means of identifying significant 
responses on a test. But, in a fuller symbolic sense, it also represents a major part 
of the theoretical bases for interpretation of test responses, and thus is crucial to 
the usefulness of the test. Here the legal issues become murkier, and we need to 
draw distinctions between what the law says, what the legal system will probably 
do, and what we think the law should be. 
The legal question is whether scoring keys are an "original work of au-
thorship" within the meaning of 17 U .S.C. § 102(a), or whether it better falls 
under the terms of 17 U.S .C. § 102(b), which provides that: 
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to 
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work (Copyright Act of 1976). 
This provision seems to suggest the information contained in the scoring key is 
not copyrightable, although the format and design of the scoring key would be. 
That seems to us a good prediction of how courts will apply the law. But there 
may be reasoned disagreement about whether this is what the law should be. 
Norms, reliability and validation research, and the cookbook classification 
schemes underlying many interpretive systems, raise similar problems as scoring 
keys. Whenever the work of expressing an idea or information , such as the 
percentile ranks of test scores in a population, is but a small part of the work of 
discovering or establishing that information, there is a tension between the 
protection, or lack of it, offered by current copyright law and the protection we 
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may desire under some moral theory that would reward hard work and expendi-
ture of time. Lawyers and psychologists have yet to sort out the rights of test 
authors in the theoretical rationale represented by a scoring or classification 
scheme, beyond its expression in a particular key or cookbook (which is clearly 
copyrightable), as well as the rights of researchers in the information contained in 
their findings, beyond its expression in a particular table or graph . 
On the one hand, the language of § 102(b) and a literal interpretation of § 
103(b) of the Copyright Act, which offers no exclusive protection for pre-exist-
ing material collected in a compilation of facts, suggest that the data expressed in 
tables of norms are not copyrightable subject matter. Norms are numerical fig-
ures that reflect the results of relevant calculations derived from standardization 
groups. They are, it could be argued, experimentally derived, discovered and 
pre-existing information, not original works of authorship. Under this interpreta-
tion, one could use norms published by a test publisher or researcher to score a 
computer-administered version of a test and to develop an original interpretive 
system and subsequent report without a copyright infringement. This approach 
seems consistent with academic traditions of wide and open dissemination of 
scientific knowledge without any proprietary constraints on use of the 
information. 
On the other hand, one of the purposes of copyright law may be to encourage 
the discovery of useful information by offering protection to those who undertake 
the work, especially if they expend a great deal of time and energy in producing 
the work, the so-called "sweat of the brow" test. If such protection is not 
offered, people may be discouraged from doing the work, or do so only in secret. 
This would seriously inhibit scientific progress. 
A recent case illustrates the uncertainty in this area of the law. In 1984, a 
federal district court in Illinois rendered a decision in Rand McNally & Co. v. 
Fleet Management Systems, Inc . (1984), holding that rearrangement of protected 
printed data, in this case mileage from one city to another, in computer form was 
not sufficient to circumvent allegations of infringement because of the great cost 
and energy expended in obtaining the original data. However, a year later, a court 
of appeals having jurisdiction over federal cases in Illinois ruled in another case, 
Rocliford Map Pub., Inc. v. Directory Service of Colorado, Inc. (1985), that, 
"The copyright laws protect the work, not the amount of effort expended," that, 
"the input of time is irrelevant," and that copyright does not cover "the underly-
ing information" (p. 148). In light of that decision, the defendant in Rand 
McNally successfully petitioned the Illinois federal district court to reconsider its 
1984 decision. After reconsideration, in February, 1986, the court conceded that 
the reasoning of its 1984 decision would have been different if had been decided 
after Rocliford Map. 
However, the court ruled for the plaintiff on other grounds. The court ac-
knowledged that facts, as opposed to their means of expression, are not 
copyrightable. However, the court asserted that the Rand McNally atlas was a 
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copyrightable compilation of facts that was copied in its entirety into the data 
base by the defendant and the fact that the information had to be formatted to be 
useful for a particular computer or program was irrelevant. As a consequence, it 
was reasonable to find a copyright infringement (Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet 
Management Systems, Inc ., 1986). Yet the court freely acknowledged that "The 
copyrightability of factual compilations ... presents intellectual difficulties in 
determining where protectible copying of facts ends and unlawful copying of the 
compilation begins." It went on to say, "Case law and scholarly authori-
ty . . . only confirm the degree to which the courts are divided on the scope of 
copyright protection in this area" (p. 9). For confirmation of this assertion 
compare Patry (1985) with Denicola (1981). 
In conventional testing, the publisher's time and expense in producing test 
materials and whatever other work they undertake to develop, such as norms and 
other data, are recaptured when the test user pays for the test materials and test 
booklets themselves. Researchers have been compensated, if at all, by working 
with or for publishers, or by other rewards of academic status and the like. But 
the economic conditions of academic life are changing (see , e.g., Shank, 1984), 
as is the competitive environment for test publishers. We should expect difficul-
ties surrounding the ownership of intellectual property to continue until a new 
consensus concerning the rights of all the players has been established by science 
and the law. 
There is now one judicial opinion concerning CPT which exemplifies the 
issues and the conflicts we have been discussing. The opinion is by no means 
definitive as it represents a single decision rendered by one federal court of 
appeals. However, it should be taken seriously, especially by small computer 
software vendors. 
The case involves the University of Minnesota and National Computer Sys-
tems (NCS) as plaintiffs and Applied Innovations (AI), a software entrepreneur, 
as defendant. AI sold two software programs for scoring the Minnesota Multi-
phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), the test at issue in this case . One contained 
38 test statements gleaned from the MMPI, commonly known as the "Grayson 
Critical Items." The other program did not contain any test items but provided 
directions to the software user on how to copy the user's self-chosen MMPI test 
statements into the sof~ware program. Once the user typed in the statements, the 
copied statements that were answered by the client in the critical direction were 
printed, along with the report of the client's score. 
The University of Minnesota and NCS, a private for-profit company licensed 
by the university to distribute MMPI test products and services, sued AI for 
copyright infringement, along with several other intellectual property and unfair 
competition claims. Among other issues were the copyrightability of the test 
statements, scoring data, and correlation tables. 
With regard to the test statements, AI argued that because the test statements 
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are short phrases, copied from prior works, and were only a small part of the 550 
items, they were not due copyright protection. However, the trial court held that 
the MMPI test statements used by AI were copyrightable. The court said that the 
MMPI's authors "used sufficient creative intellectual labor" and significant inde-
pendent intellectual effort" to create the test statements, thus satisfying the 
copyright law's originality requirement, even though the authors had relied on 
prior scales for the MMPI items (Regents of the University of Minnesota v. 
Applied Innovations, Inc., 1987, p. 707). 
More importantly, the court also held that the scoring direction, scale mem-
bership, and T-score conversion data for the various scales were protected by 
copyright as well. AI had argued that these scoring data were merely discovered 
facts (such as mileage between cities) and not copyrightable. The court said that 
"methods used to assess human characteristics or traits are not within the mean-
ing of discovered facts ... " (p. 708). The court further stated that the T-Score 
conversion data were not simply an accidental marriage between the raw score 
and an arbitrary value. Rather, it said, "the authors exercised significant judg-
ment and creative intellectual effort in deciding which norming device to use" 
(p. 708) and should be accorded copyright protection as well. 
Finally, the plaintiffs prevailed on their claim that its correlation tables were 
copyrightable. Compilations (the arranging, organizing, and selecting of pre-
viously existing material) can be copyrighted. However, the copyright protection 
is granted to the form of the compilation, not necessarily to the data themselves . 
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the hard work associated with bringing 
together the data in tabular form was "sufficient to satisfy the originality require-
ment and justify copyright protection as a compilation." However, the court did 
not find that AI had infringed on the plaintiffs' tables as there was no proof 
supporting the allegation that AI has reproduced the information in the tables in 
the same arrangement as the plaintiffs. 
Notwithstanding the court's finding concerning the correlation tables, AI lost 
on all other copyright issues. "AI copied everything of commercial significance 
with regard to scoring and interpreting the MMPI test" (p. 711), the court held. 
As a result, the court ordered AI to pay NCS more than $225 ,000 in damages. In 
a later hearing in early 1988, the court enjoined AI from reproducing or distribut-
ing software containing MMPI test statements, scale definitions and correction 
factors, and normative statements or T-score conversion data pending appeal of 
its decision by the defendant. The court also awarded an additional $162,000 in 
damages to the university. However, all monetary awards were suspended pend-
ing resolution of the appeal. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rendered its decision in May 
1989, affirming virtually all of the trial court's ruling . The appellate tribunal 
agreed that the MMPI test statements were copyrightable, including the revisions 
of questions in preexisting tests , which the court called copyrightable "distin-
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guishable variations" (p. 635), and that the normative test data were copyrighta-
ble as well as "expressions of facts or processes," although the court called it a 
"close question" (p. 636): 
We think the MMPI testing data are copyrightable expressions of factors or pro-
cesses . Our conclusion is expressly based upon the district court's findings of fact 
about the methods the authors used to develop the MMPI testing data. The district 
court found that although the authors began with certain discovered facts, statistical 
models and mathematical principles, which cannot be copyrighted, they then made 
certain adjustments on the basis of their expertise and clinical experience. In other 
words, the MMPI testing data, at least for purposes of analysis under the copyright 
law, do not represent pure statements of fact or psychological theory; they are 
instead original expressions of those facts or processes as applied and as such are 
copyrightable (p. 636). 
With regard to damages, the court of appeals upheld the entire damage award. It 
did affirm the district court's decision to deny plaintiffs the attorney's fees they 
had expended in litigating the case, indicating that "the litigation involved nu-
merous complex or novel questions which defendant had litigated vigorously and 
in good faith" (p. 638). 
By far, the most controversial aspect of MMPI case is the court's decision 
concerning the normative data. As we have indicated, test items are copyrighta-
ble (although AI did have a credible argument that the precise MMPI items used 
were not copyrighted as original expressions, given the fact that they were 
gleaned from prior texts). Scoring tables, as tables, are copyrightable as well as 
compilations of pre-existing material (although the material in the tables itself 
may not be copyrightable). We find less persuasive the court's holding that 
scoring tables are not merely discovered facts (which are not copyrightable) but 
protected under the copyright law because of the judgment and hard work that 
went into developing the scoring system. As we have seen, another court of 
appeals in the Rocliford Map case held that the copyright laws do not protect the 
amount of effort expended or the underlying information that is placed in the 
computer. But in ruling for the university and NCS, the district court in 
the MMPI case adopted the "sweat of the brow" test and the court appeals did 
not challenge that reasoning. Finally, in holding that the scoring data were copy-
rightable, both courts relied on Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co. (1981) to support 
their position . However, in that case, a magazine had copied a psychologist's test 
items, not his scoring system. Thus, Rubin is inapposite in supporting the courts' 
holding. In any event, the university and NCS have prevailed and AI is prevented 
from selling its MMPI software programs and has suffered a tremendous, if not 
business-killing monetary loss. 
Thus, we will reiterate our original caveat. The copyrightability of scoring 
systems is a highly controversial area and the law in this area is very unsettled. 
At an APA-sponsored forum on computerized testing issues a few years ago, it 
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was very clear from the comments made by traditional test publishers that they 
are ready and willing to litigate the issue of copyright of norms. The MMPI case 
illustrates their genuine determination to do so. So, if readers are contemplating 
developing scoring and interpretive systems based on published norms, they 
should consult their own legal counsel. 
Interestingly, concealing and protecting the information contained in scoring 
keys, classification systems, and research useful for interpretation is easier in 
CPT than in conventional paper-and-pencil tests, where the human-readable 
paper key or published cookbook is available to test users who can easily recast 
the information in a different form and, perhaps, avoid copyright infringement. 
CPT offers the possibility of embedding much of this information in a secret 
program. Only if required to divulge the information to users does the CPT 
developer creating a new fully computerized test place this data in the public 
arena. It should be obvious that how the professions of law and psychology 
resolve these issues will greatly determine the future of research and develop-
ment in psychological assessment. 
THE RIGHTS OF TEST TAKERS 
The final issue we discuss concerns the major legal challenge to psychological 
tests in recent years. Critics have charged that testing denies minorities, women, 
and the handicapped a fair evaluation due to bias in the test. A new concern is 
that because the advantages of computer technology are distributed unevenly, a 
modern version of cultural bias may result. Some may argue that groups lacking 
in computer experience will be disadvantaged if forced to take tests on comput-
ers. This concern is genuine; people familiar with computers could well have an 
advantage taking a CPT over a novice whose normal test anxiety is compounded 
when they are confronted with an unfamiliar machine. 
Unfamiliarity with computers could be correlated with ethnicity, gender, age , 
and socioeconomic status, so any effect due to unfamiliarity might appear statis-
tically as poorer performance by some groups, even though the more direct 
explanation of any performance difference would be the unfamiliarity, not group 
membership. (We are here discussing only those group differences that arise from 
the mode oftest administration, not all group differences though the analysis may 
apply to some of them as well. In analysis of variance terms, we are discussing 
the group x mode interaction, not any main effect for group.) Currently, there is 
no evidence suggesting any particular group is disadvantaged when tested by 
computer instead of conventionally, but the research is scanty. Investigators have 
noted that many elderly persons are uncomfortable with CPT (Carr, Wilson, 
Ghosh, Ancil, & Woods, 1982; Volans & Levy, 1982). One early study found 
that Blacks did better on a computerized version of an intelligence test than on a 
pencil-and-paper version, though whites' scores were unchanged (Johnson & 
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Mihal, 1973), prompting the authors to hypothesize that CPT may eliminate 
some sources of examiner- examinee bias allegedly present in conventional test-
ing . This study had only 10 subjects in each group, and there were other meth-
odological flaws (Jensen, 1980), so any conclusions are highly speculative. 
In fact, a "group differences" approach to the study of test performance is 
often misguided . The legal system has encouraged this kind of study since 
judicial recognition of unfairness in a test has been largely limited to cases where 
the unfairness is cast in terms of ethnic or gender group differences. But the 
unfairness of a test, if any, probably will not divide cleanly along these lines. 
Averaging across individual group members to determine Black/white or 
male/female differences obscures the most important information. Not every 
group member will be uniformly affected by taking a test on a computer. What 
we need is a refined list of test taker characteristics that could alert us to potential 
problems with computer administration and, if possible, allow us to remedy the 
source of the problem. Mere group membership is likely to be a very imprecise 
predictor of problems as it sheds no light on the cause of a problem and it offers 
no prescription for remediation. Characteristics that may be direct sources of 
diminished performance , such as unfamiliarity, are a better focus of study than 
are weak and indirect predictors such as gender. 
All test takers should be familiar with the equipment and procedures so that 
they can devote their full attention to the substance of the test items. Training and 
practice should be provided to those who need it for as long as they like . For 
example, Johnson and White (1980) found that elderly people who received 1 
hour of training in the use of a terminal prior to testing scored significantly higher 
on the Wonderlic Personnel Inventory than did those who received no training. 
Current evidence suggests any initial anxiety caused by the computer is short-
lived for most people if they are given adequate practice (Lushene, O'Neil, & 
Dunn, 1974), and may be more a result of poorly designed procedures than of 
anything intrinsic to the computer (Hedl, O'Neil, & Hansen, 1973). However, 
the advent of such novel complaints as "cyberphobia," and the development of 
potential cures (e.g., user-friendly terminals and computer tutorials) suggest that 
the psychologist must be aware of the effect of computerized administration on 
the test taker, and not assume everyone is comfortable with the machine. 
A major concern about computer-generated reports is that they may not be as 
individualized as those generated in the conventional manner. Some information, 
such as demographic characteristics of the examinee, can be included in in~ 
terpretation programs so that the computer will use more appropriate norms or 
base rates if they exist and qualify interpretations to take into account the particu-
lar test taker's characteristics. But no program can consider all the unique at-
tributes of each individual and in most cases the same programmed decision rules 
will be applied to all test scores. 
The revised Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (APA et 
aI., 1985), clearly indicates that test users are ultimately responsible for their test 
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interpretations, no matter from what format the data are derived. Assessing the 
validity of interpretations requires that a human being observe the testing situa-
tion and decide if conditions are present that could invalidate test results. It is 
imperative that the final act of decision making be that of a qualified practitioner, 
consistent with state law, ethical principles, and professional standards, who 
takes responsibility for overseeing both the process of testing and judging the 
applicability of the interpretive report for individual examinees. 
There must be an interposition of human judgment between the CPT report 
and decision making to ensure that decisions are made with full sensitivity to all 
the nuances of test administration and interpretation, and the unique constellation 
of attributes in each person is evaluated. Relying solely on test developers' 
computerized conception of the test taker's responses isolated from a clinician's 
trained observation of the test taker's behavior during the administration of the 
test, may tend to create bland, impersonal, and nonspecific assessments that fail 
to capture the test taker's cognitive, affective, and behavioral functioning across 
a variety of situations. 
CONCLUSION 
Anyone who doubts the importance of remaining sensitive to the individuality of 
each test taker might benefit from reflecting on what could happen if our friend, 
the legal scholar, gets his way and computers replace judges in courts of law. The 
laws relevant to CPT would be expressed as a set of preprogrammed rules: If 
certain conditions are met, then a certain consequence would follow. Deciding a 
case of malpractice, for example, would then be a simple matter of plugging in 
the facts and letting the machine generate the verdict. 
There would be a tendency to use rules that have clearly discernible condi-
tions, instead of rules that require difficult determinations of sincerity or good 
faith. Only if the rules were continuously updated could they take into account 
relevant new developments in CPT, and only if every relevant factual condition 
were a part of the system could we be sure that the verdict was a correct one. In 
those cases where factual issues were in dispute, the legal system's traditional 
rule of relying on the discretion of judges and juries to determine the credibility 
of witnesses or assign the proper weight to be given admissible evidence would 
be severely attenuated, if not eliminated. In all cases, even where the facts were 
agreed upon and only the application of the law to the facts was at issue, there 
would be less room for creativity in decision making, and more centralized 
control. We might even fear that widespread computerized justice would lead to 
an abdication of responsibility among lawyers, who would blindly accept ma-
chine verdicts without knowing how they were made or without questioning if 
the verdict was a good one. 
We cannot treat our clients with any less respect than we would want from 
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someone empowered to make decisions affecting our vital interests . If we bear in 
mind both the potential and the limits of CPT, the future of psychological testing 
should be bright. And there should be no need to develop a computer judge to 
decide if CPT is being practiced in an ethical and legal manner. 
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